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between players in order to nd out whether there exists a coalition in which player i is
desirable over another player j as a coalition partner. In this paper we outline a much
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1 Introduction
The issue of voting power and its measurement concerns any collective decision making body
which has to decide whether to accept or reject a bill by the process of voting. Typically,
when a bill is presented before a voting body, the members either vote in favor of the bill
or against it. Sometimes a voter has the option to abstain. However, as is common in most
of the literature in this area, we ignore abstention so that the voters have only two choices
- to either vote \yes" or \no". The class of mathematical structures that is used to model
such situations is a simple voting game (SV G) or simply, a simple game which is dened
by a nite set of players or voters and a monotonic family of winning coalitions. Examples
of such decision making bodies include the United Nations Security Council, the Council of
Ministers in the European Union, the Lok Sabha of the Republic of India, the board room
of any corporate house etc. The voting procedure in each of these collectivities is governed
by its own constitution, which lays down the decision making rule of the collectivity. This
decision making rule aggregates individual votes to arrive at the collective decision of the
voting body as a whole. There can be many kinds of decision rules, e.g., simple majority
decision rule, some qualied majority rule, unanimity rule etc to name a few. In fact a
decision making voting body can have any decision rule provided it satises the following
intuitively appealing conditions:
1. If all players vote in favor of a bill, it should be passed.
2. If all players vote against a bill, it should be rejected.
3. Increased support for a bill cannot hurt its prospects.
A decision rule is often characterized in terms of how it distributes power among the
individual players or voters. In this framework, by the voting power of an individual player
under a given decision rule, we mean the extent of control that the player possesses over the
decision making process due to the decision rule alone. In other words, it is the constitutional
power of the voter (see Felsenthal and Machover (1998)).
However, often there are situations where we are more concerned with the ranking or
hierarchy of players in terms of their inuence rather than the quantication of the amount
of a-priori inuence that players have. Many number-based indices exist that give us a
measure of the constitutional power that an individual voter possesses. The ones that are
most mentioned in the literature are the Shapley-Shubik (SS) (Shapley and Shubik, 1954)
and the Banzhaf-Coleman (BC) (Banzhaf 1965, Coleman 1971) indices (for more on power
indices see Felsenthal and Machover (1998)). These indices associate a real number to each
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voter, thereby inducing a complete preordering in the set of voters. As an example, a voter i
with a high value of the SS index ranks higher in the SS preordering than another voter j for
whom the value of the SS index is lower. Thus, according to the SS preordering, voter i has
more a-priori power or control over the collective action of the voting body than the voter
j: Sometimes these indices may end up ranking the voters di¤erently (see Saari and Sieberg
(2001)). But if we restrict our attention to weighted voting games1 (see Tomiyama (1987))
or better still swap robust (linear) voting games, which form a larger class of voting games
than weighted voting games (see Di¤o Lambo and Moulen (2002)), SS and BC preorderings
coincide2. Thus, given a simple swap robust game, one way of nding out the hierarchy
induced in the set of players by the decision rule is by evaluating any one of the above
mentioned indices for each player. This means we would have to calculate the number of
winning coalitions in which a player is decisive, for all the players.
The other method by which we can determine the ranking of players is by using the
desirability (or inuence) relation introduced by Isbell (1958) (also see Isbell (1956), Taylor
(1995)). The desirability relation ranks voters with respect to how inuential they are in
the voting process, without assigning numbers to them. A voter whose vote is never pivotal
or critical in any situation, i.e., who can never change the outcome of the voting process
by changing the way he/she votes may be regarded as one who does not have any inuence
over the decision making process. A voter whose \yesvote is necessary for the passage
of the bill is a very inuential voter. However, in most cases, a voter is critical in some
situations, while in others he/she is not. That is, a typical voter can change the nal
outcome of the decision making process in some situations, while in other situations, the
way he/she votes is irrelevant for the nal outcome. It was established by Taylor (1995) that
the desirability relation induces a complete preordering in the set of voters if and only if the
simple game is swap robust. Furthermore, Di¤o Lambo and Moulen (2002) have shown that
this preordering coincides with the SS and BC preorderings if the simple game is linear or
swap robust. Thus, given a swap robust simple game, we could determine the ranking of
players by conducting a pairwise comparison whereby a player i is ranked higher than player
j if there is a coalition in which i is desirable over j as a coalition partner. This would take
less time than having to evaluate one of the classical indices discussed above, since we could
restrict our attention to the set of minimal winning coalitions rather than the entire set of
1Weighted voting games are a class of SV Gs that can be represented by a system of non-negative weights
and a quota. The vote of each player carries a non-negative weight. A bill is passed if and only if the sum
of the weights (of the votes) of all players who vote in favor of the bill is at least as large as the predened
quota. Voting by disciplined party groups in multiparty parliaments can be modelled as weighted voting
games. All weighted voting games are swap robust (Taylor and Zwicker (1993)).
2Carreras and Freixas (2008) have extended the above result to all preorderings induced by regular
semivalues in a larger class of simple games called weakly linear simple games.
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winning coalitions. However, pairwise comparison may prove to be tedious, specially if the
set of minimal winning coalitions is large.
The main result in this paper is as follows: a player i has more a-priori inuence than
player j if and only if the vector M(i); dened by the cardinalities of the minimal winning
coalitions to which i belongs, dominates the vectorM(j) in lexicographic ordering. Moreover,
a player i has the same a-priori inuence as player j if and only if the vectorM(i) is equal to
M(j). This elegant result can be used to determine the hierarchy (in terms of constitutional
power) that is induced in the set of voters by the decision rule in a very straightforward
manner. Since it involves only minimal winning coalitions, the method proves to be e¢ cient
as well in the sense that it can determine the hierarchy in a much shorter time. In what
follows we restict our attention to linear or swap robust simple voting games only.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the preliminaries.
In section 3 we present the motivation behind the paper while we present our main result in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Denitions and preliminaries
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be a non-empty nite set. We refer to the elements of N as players
or voters. The collection of all subsets of N is denoted by P(N). Any member of P(N) is
called a coalition. Given any family of sets F , we will use the notation jFj to denote the
number of elements in the family.
The class of mathematical structures used to model voting situations is called simple
voting games (SV G). Formally,
Denition 1 A simple voting game (SV G) G is a pair (N ;V ), where N is the set of voters,
and V : P(N)  ! f0; 1g is the characteristic function satisfying the following conditions:
[C1] V () = 0
[C2] V (N) = 1
[C3] S  T ) V (S)  V (T )
The above denition formalizes the idea of a decision making committee in which decisions
are made by vote. The decision making rule is embodied in the characteristic function V .
A coalition S 2 P(N) is said to be a winning (losing) coalition if and only if V (S) = 1
(V (S) = 0). We denote the set of winning coalitions of the game G by W : [C1] says that if
nobody votes in favor of the bill, the bill should be rejected. On the other hand, if everybody
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votes yes, the bill should be passed ([C2]). [C3] is a monotonicity requirement which says
that more support for a bill cannot hurt the prospects of the bill. A coalition X 2 W is
said to be a minimal winning coalition if no proper subset of it is winning, i.e., if for any
X 0  X; X 0 =2 W. We denote the set of minimal winning coalitions in G by Wmin: Because
of the monotonicity requirement [C3] on the decision rule, one can see that the family of
winning coalitions W, can be totally characterized by the set Wmin. Furthermore, since the
set Wmin is determined by V , we can say that Wmin reects the decision rule.
Given a coalition X 2 W, a player i 2 X is said to be a critical defector in X if
Xnfig =2 W : It therefore follows that given a coalition X 2 Wmin, every player belonging
to X is a critical defector, since it can render the coalition losing by leaving it. A player
i 2 N is a dummy player if he/she does not belong to any minimal winning coalition. It is
obvious that the way a dummy player votes is inconsequential to the nal outcome of the
voting process. Sometimes, in the context of constitutional power, dummy players may arise
inadvertently. For example, the allocation of weights in the original six member Council of
Ministers of the European Union made Luxembourg a dummy player under the voting rule
during 1958-72 (see Felsenthal and Machover (2001)). On the other hand, a player i 2 N
is called a veto player if he/she is a member of every minimal winning coalition. Thus, a
veto player can prevent the adoption of a bill unilaterally (irrespective of how others vote)
by voting \no". Examples of veto players abound in the real world. The ve permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council are veto players.
Next we dene the desirability or the inuence relation introduced by Isbell (1958).
Denition 2 Consider an SV G and two players i; j 2 N . Let i D j if and only if
8X  Nnfi; jg; X [ fjg 2 W ) X [ fig 2 W : Then D is a preordering called the
desirability relation. i D j if and only if i D j and j D i: i D j if and only if i D j
and j D i:
D is called the strict desirability relation and D is the equi-desirability relation. We
say that a player i is desirable over j as a coalition partner for X  Nnfi; jg if X [fig 2 W
but X [ fjg =2 W.
Remark 1 It easily follows from the above denition that given an SV G and two voters
i; j 2 N; if i D j; then there must exist a coalition X  Nnfi; jg such that X [fig 2 Wmin
but X [ fjg =2 Wmin: This is because if i D j, then there exists a coalition X  Nnfi; jg
such that X[fig 2 W but X[fjg =2 W : Suppose that X[fig =2 Wmin: Then there must be a
coalition X 0  X [ fig, such that X 0 2 Wmin: Furthermore, we must have i 2 X 0, otherwise
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it contradicts the fact that X =2 W : Thus X 0 is a minimal winning coalition containing i but
not j: However, since X [ fjg =2 W, we cannot have X 0nfig [ fjg 2 Wmin:
Denition 3 An SV G is swap robust if for any two coalitions X;Y 2 W, and i 2 X n Y ,
j 2 Y nX, either X n fig [ fjg 2 W or Y n fjg [ fig 2 W.
The concept of swap robustness was introduced by Taylor and Zwicker (1993). An SV G
is swap robust if one could swap two members in two winning coalitions and get at least one
winning coalition as a result. Swap robust games, also known in the literature as complete
or linear voting games, is a big class of SV Gs for which the inuence relation dened above
induces a complete preordering in the set of voters (see Taylor (1995)). For more on swap
robust games, also see Taylor and Zwicker (1999), Carreras and Freixas (1996), Freixas and
Pons (2008), Freixas and Molinero (2009).
3 The desirability relation and winning coalitions
Let us begin this section by an example. Consider a simple game G on the voter set
fa; b; c; d; eg, where the decision rule results in the following set of minimal winning coali-
tions: Wmin = ffa; bg ; fa; c; dg; fa; c; eg; fb; c; d; egg : It can be veried that the game is
swap robust.
In order to determine the hierarchy of the players in terms of their constituional power
using one of the classical indices, say the BC index, we would need to list the entire set of
winning coalitions.
W = ffa; bg ; fa; c; dg; fa; c; eg; fb; c; d; eg; fa; b; cg; fa; b; dg; fa; b; eg; fa; b; c; dg; fa; b; c; eg;
fa; b; d; eg, fa; c; d; eg; fa; b; c; d; egg
Let us dene the following set:
C (i) = fX 2 W : i 2 X and Xnfig =2 Wg
That is, C (i) is the set of all winning coalitions in which voter i 2 N is a critical defector.
The Banzhaf-Coleman index BC for a voter i 2 N is given by
BCi =
C (i)
2n 1
Therefore, evaluating BC for each player in the given simple game we get, BCa = 1016 ;
BCb =
6
16
; BCc =
4
16
; BCd =
2
16
; BCe =
2
16
: Thus, we have the following hierarchy: a D
b D c D d D e: According to us, the main disadvantage of using the power indices in
order to determine the ranking among players lies in the fact that not only do we need to
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nd all winning coalitions but also determine the number of winning coalitions in which a
voter is a critical defector3.
If on the other hand we use the desirability relation to reveal the hierarchy, we can restrict
our attention to the setWmin only. Since by replacing a by b in the coalition fa; c; dg, we fail
to get a winning coalition, it means that there exists a situation in which a is more desirable
as a coalition partner than b: Hence a D b: Since fa; bg 2 Wmin but fa; cg =2 W, we have b
D c: Similarly, since fa; c; eg 2 Wmin but fa; d; eg =2 W, we have c D d: However, there
does not exist a coalition in which d is more desirable than e; or where e is more desirable
than d: Hence d D e: Thus we reveal the hierarchy as a D b D c D d D e: But this
kind of pairwise comparison may prove cumbersome specially if the set Wmin is large.
Since, considering the set of minimal winning coalitions alone reduces a lot of work,
we also restrict our attention to the set Wmin: However, the question arises whether we
can use the information provided by Wmin more e¢ ciently in order to reveal the hierarchy
of the players in a shorter time. In this paper we present a mechanism to determine the
hierarchy that is decidedly simpler than the existing methods and is devoid of any algebraic
computations.
Let us dene another set:
C (i;m) = fX 2 C (i) : jXj = mg, where m is an integer, 1  m  n:
That is, C (i;m) is the set of all winning coalitions of size m; in which voter i is a critical
defector.
Carreras and Freixas (2008) introduced the term weak desirability relation for the follow-
ing:
Denition 4 Consider an SV G and two players i; j 2 N . Let i d j if and only if for
every integer m; 1  m  n; jC (i;m)j  jC(j;m)j : Then d is a preordering called the
weak desirability relation. i d j if and only if i d j and j d i: i d j if and only if i d j
and j d i:
d is called the strict weak desirability relation and d is the weak equi-desirability
relation.
Di¤o Lambo and Moulen (2002) established that the weak desirability preordering co-
incides with the desirability preordering if the game is swap robust. (They however did not
3Recently Kirsch and Langner (2009) have presented a combinatorial formula to calculate the SS and
BC indices by using the set of minimal winning coalitions only.
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use the term weak desirability, which was introduced later by Carreras and Freixas (2008)).
Their result is formally stated without the proof as Theorem 3.1 below:
Theorem 3.1 Consider a swap robust SV G and i; j 2 N: Then the following two statements
are equivalent:
(a) i D j
(b) For every integer m; 1  m  n; jC (i;m)j  jC(j;m)j ; that is, i d j :
Furthermore, the following two statements are also equivalent:
(c) i D j
(d) For every integer m; 1  m  n; jC (i;m)j  jC (j;m)j and there is at least one value
of m for which jC (i;m)j > jC (j;m)j :
If the above theorem keeps itself when we restrict our attention to the set of minimal
winning coalitions, we might have an easier way of determining the hierarchy of players from
the set Wmin. Dene the following sets:
 Cmin (i) = X 2 Wmin : i 2 X	
 Cmin (i;m) = X 2 Cmin (i) : jXj = m	, where m is an integer 1  m  n:
That is, Cmin (i) is the set of all minimal winning coalitions to which voter i 2 N belongs.
By the denition of a minimal winning coalition, i is a critical defector in each of the
coalitions in Cmin (i) : Similarly, Cmin (i;m) is the set of all minimal winning coalitions of
size m of which voter i is a member. Given a swap robust game, if we can show that i D j
is equivalent to saying that for every integer m; 1  m  n; Cmin (i;m)  Cmin (j;m),
we will have achieved our objective. However, it is not so. We nd that for a swap robust
SV G, and two voters i and j, i D j does not imply that for every integer m; 1  m  n;Cmin (i;m)  Cmin (j;m) : Furthermore, we know that if i D j then we must have
jC (i)j  jC (j)j : However, i D j does not imply that
Cmin (i)  Cmin (j) : If we go back
to the example stated at the beginning of the section we have:
 Cmin (a; 2) = 1; Cmin (a; 3) = 2; Cmin (a; 4) = 0
 Cmin (b; 2) = 1; Cmin (b; 3) = 0; Cmin (b; 4) = 1
 Cmin (c; 2) = 0; Cmin (c; 3) = 2; Cmin (c; 4) = 1
 Cmin (d; 2) = 0; Cmin (d; 3) = 1; Cmin (d; 4) = 1
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 Cmin (e; 2) = 0; Cmin (e; 3) = 1; Cmin (e; 4) = 1
Thus a D b but
Cmin (a; 4) < Cmin (b; 4) : Similarly, b D c but Cmin (b; 3) <Cmin (c; 3) : Also we have b D c but Cmin (b) < Cmin (c) : Thus this example reveals
that neither the value of
Cmin (i) nor that of Cmin (i;m) says much about the relative
position of player i in the hierarchy of players.
4 The desirability relation and minimal winning coali-
tions
Given an SV G, consider the set Wmin of all minimal winning coalitions. Let us partition
the set as follows
Wmin = Wmin(k1); Wmin(k2); :::;Wmin(kT )	
where Wmin(kt) = fX 2 Wmin : jXj = ktg. T denotes the number of di¤erent sizes
of minimal winning coalitions and is a positive integer  1. kt is an integer such that
n  kt  1, for all t 2 f1; :::; Tg: We also have k1 < k2 < ::: < kT : Thus, k1 denotes the size
of the smallest minimal winning coalition and kT is the size of the largest minimal winning
coalition. In the example discussed in the previous section, T = 3; k1 = 2; k2 = 3 and k3 = 4:
For every i 2 N; let us consider the following vector that is dened by the cardinalities
of the minimal winning coalitions to which it belongs:
M(i) = (c1(i); c2(i); :::; cT (i)); where ct(i) =
Cmin (i; kt) ; 1  t  T:
It is obvious that ct(i)  0 8t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg: Thus M(i) 2 (N [ f0g)T ; where N denotes
the set of natural numbers: The tth coordinate of the vector M(i) is the number of minimal
winning coalitions of size kt of which voter i is a member. If i 2 N is a dummy player,
then M(i) = (0; 0; :::; 0): If i 2 N is a veto player, then M(i) = (w1; w2; :::; wT ) ; where
wt =
Wmin(kt) ; 8t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg:
Denition 5 Consider an SV G and any two players i, j 2 N: Let M(i) and M(j) 2
(N [ f0g)T be the associated vectors. Then M(i) = M(j) if and only if ct(i) = ct(j) 8t 2
f1; 2; :::; Tg:
Denition 6 Consider an SV G and any two players i, j 2 N: Let M(i) and M(j) 2
(N [ f0g)T be the associated vectors. Then M(i) is said to dominate M(j) if and only if
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M(i) lies above M(j) in lexicographic ordering, that is, there exists a t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg such
that ct(i) > ct(j) and ct(i) = ct(j) 8t < t: We denote this by M(i) >L M(j):
We write M(i) L M(j) if either M(i) =M(j) or M(i) >L M(j):
Next we present a proposition which is crucial in proving Theorem 4.2 below.
Proposition 4.1 Consider a swap robust SV G and any two players i; j 2 N: LetM(i);M(j) 2
(N [ f0g)T be the associated vectors. Let h (1  h  T ) be the maximum value of t
such that ct(i) = ct(j) 8t 2 f1; 2; :::; hg: Then 8X 2 Cmin (i; kt), such that j =2 X and
8t 2 f1; 2; :::; hg; we have Xnfig[fjg 2 Cmin (j; kt) : Also 8Y 2 Cmin (j; kt), such that i =2 Y
and 8t 2 f1; 2; :::; hg; we have Y nfjg [ fig 2 Cmin (i; kt) :
Proof. We will prove this by induction on t. Since the SV G is swap robust, let us assume
without loss of generality that i D j:
Step 1: Take a coalition Y1 2 Cmin (j; k1), where k1 is the size of the smallest minimal
winning coalition: We can assume that c1 (j) 6= 0: Now, i may or may not belong to Y1: If
i 2 Y1; then we have Y1 2 Cmin (i; k1) : Suppose i =2 Y1: Then, since i D j; Y1nfjg[fig 2 W
and i is a critical defector in it. However, Y1nfjg [ fig may or may not be a minimal
winning coalition. If Y1nfjg [ fig 2 Wmin, then Y1nfjg [ fig 2 Cmin (i; k1) : But suppose
that Y1nfjg [ fig =2 Wmin: This means there exists a coalition Y 01  Y1nfjg such that
Y 01 [ fig 2 Wmin: However it is obvious that jY 01 [ figj < k1: This contradicts the fact that
k1 is the size of the smallest minimal winning coalition. Therefore, we can construct an
injective mapping
'1 : C
min (j; k1)  ! Cmin (i; k1)
where
'1 (Y ) =
(
Y nfjg [ fig if i =2 Y
Y otherwise
:
This together with the fact that c1 (i) = c1 (j) implies that the mapping is bijective, that
is, 8X 2 Cmin (i; k1) ; such that j =2 X we have Xnfig [ fjg 2 Cmin (j; k1) :
Step 2: Now consider the family Cmin (j; k2) : Take a coalition Y2 2 Cmin (j; k2) : If i 2 Y2;
then we have Y2 2 Cmin (i; k2) : Suppose i =2 Y2: Since by assumption i D j; we must have
Y2nfjg[fig 2 W and i is a critical defector in it. However, Y2nfjg[fig may or may not be
a minimal winning coalition. If Y2nfjg [ fig 2 Wmin, then Y2nfjg [ fig 2 Cmin (i; k2) : Now
suppose that Y2nfjg [ fig =2 Wmin: This means there exists a coalition Y 02  Y2nfjg such
that Y 02 [fig 2 Wmin: However it is obvious that jY 02 [ figj < k2: This means jY 02 [ figj = k1,
that is, Y 02 [ fig 2 Cmin (i; k1) : But we have already shown in step 1 that 8X 2 Cmin (i; k1) ;
such that j =2 X we have Xnfig[fjg 2 Cmin (j; k1) This implies that Y 02 [fjg 2 Cmin (j; k1)
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which in turn contradicts that Y2 2 Wmin: Therefore, we can again construct an injective
mapping
'2 : C
min (j; k2)  ! Cmin (i; k2)
where
'2 (Y ) =
(
Y nfjg [ fig if i =2 Y
Y otherwise
:
This together with the fact that c2 (i) = c2 (j) gives us that 8X 2 Cmin (i; k2) ; such that
j =2 X we have Xnfig [ fjg 2 Cmin (j; k2) :
Step 3: Consider the family Cmin (j; k3) : Take a coalition Y3 2 Cmin (j; k3) : If i 2 Y3;
then we must have Y3 2 Cmin (i; k3) : If i =2 Y3; we must have Y3nfjg [ fig 2 W and i must
be a critical defector in it. However, Y3nfjg [ fig may or may not be a minimal winning
coalition. If Y3nfjg [ fig 2 Wmin, then Y3nfjg [ fig 2 Cmin (i; k3) : Now suppose that
Y3nfjg [ fig =2 Wmin: Then there exists a coalition Y 03  Y3nfjg such that Y 03 [ fig 2 Wmin:
However it implies that jY 03 [ figj < k3: This means jY 03 [ figj is equal to either k1 or k2, that
is, either Y 03 [fig 2 Cmin (i; k1) or Y 03 [fig 2 Cmin (i; k2) : But we have already shown in steps
1 and 2 above that 8X 2 Cmin (i; kt) ; such that j =2 X we have Xnfig [ fjg 2 Cmin (j; kt) ;
t = 1; 2: This implies that either Y 03 [ fjg 2 Cmin (j; k1) or Y 03 [ fjg 2 Cmin (j; k2) : This
contradicts that Y3 2 Wmin: Therefore, we can again construct an injective mapping
'3 : C
min (j; k3)  ! Cmin (i; k3)
where
'3 (Y ) =
(
Y nfjg [ fig if i =2 Y
Y otherwise
This combined with the fact that c3 (i) = c3 (j) implies that 8X 2 Cmin (i; k3) ; such that
j =2 X we have Xnfig [ fjg 2 Cmin (j; k3) :
Step 4: Let us now assume that the result holds for all values of t = 1; 2; :::; h   1: We
will now prove that the result holds for t = h too. Consider a coalition Yh 2 Cmin (j; kh) : If
i 2 Yh; then we have Yh 2 Cmin (i; kh) : But suppose that i =2 Yh: Again by the assumption
that i D j, we must have Yhnfjg[fig 2 W and i must be a critical defector in it. However,
Yhnfjg [ fig may or may not be a minimal winning coalition. If Yhnfjg [ fig 2 Wmin, then
Yhnfjg [ fig 2 Cmin (i; kh) : If Yhnfjg [ fig =2 Wmin; it means there must exist a coalition
Y 0h  Yhnfjg such that Y 0h[fig 2 Wmin: However it is obvious that jY 0h [ figj < kh:Without
loss of generality we suppose that jY 0h [ figj = kt, that is, Y 0h [ fig 2 Cmin (i; kt) for some
1  t < h, (say) t0: But since we have assumed at the beginning of step 4 that the result holds
for 1  t < h, we have that 8X 2 Cmin (i; kt0) ; such that j =2 X, Xnfig[ fjg 2 Cmin (j; kt0) :
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This implies that Y 0h[fjg 2 Cmin (j; kt0) which in turn contradicts that Yh 2Wmin: Therefore,
we can again construct an injective mapping
'h : C
min (j; kh)  ! Cmin (i; kh)
for t = h too, where
'h (Y ) =
(
Y nfjg [ fig if i =2 Y
Y otherwise
:
Since we also have ch (i) = ch (j) ; it must be true that 8X 2 Cmin (i; kh) ; such that
j =2 X we have Xnfig [ fjg 2 Cmin (j; kh) : Hence the proof of the proposition.
Remark 2 Note that there may be some values of t, 1  t  h; such that ct(i) = ct(j) = 0:
This simply means that the players i and j do not belong to any minimal winning coalition
of size t: We intentionally ignore such values of t. It is easy to see that the inclusion of these
cases does not change the result of the proposition.
We will now use the result of the above proposition to show that in a linear voting game,
two voters i and j are equally inuential if and only if the associated vectorsM(i) andM(j)
are equal to each other. Furthermore, i is strictly more inuential than j if and only if M(i)
dominates M(j) in lexicographic ordering. We ignore the case of dummies from the analysis
since by denition a dummy player has no inuence over the decision making process.
Theorem 4.2 Let G = (N ;V ) be a swap robust SV G and i; j 2 N: Also let M(i) and M(j)
be the associated vectors. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(a) i D j
(b) M(i) =M(j)
Furthermore, the following two statements are also equivalent:
(c) i D j
(d) M(i) >L M(j)
Proof. It is easy to verify that (a)) (b).
(b) ) (a) : By the virtue of Proposition 4.1 we know that if h is the maximum value of
t such that ct (i) = ct (j) 8t 2 f1; 2; :::hg; then for all coalitions X  Nnfi; jg; X [ fig 2
Cmin (i; kt), X[fjg 2 Cmin (j; kt) : If iD j, then there must exist a coalitionX  Nnfi; jg
such that X[fig 2 Wmin but X[fjg =2 Wmin: Since there does not exist any such coalition,
we must have i D j:
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(c)) (d) :We will prove this by contradiction. Since (a), (b) ; we cannot haveM(i) 6=
M(j): Therefore supposeM(j) >L M(i): Also let h be that value of t such that ch (i) < ch (j)
and ct (i) = ct (j) ; 1  t < h: Take a coalition Y 2 Cmin (j; kh) : If i 2 Y; then we have
Y 2 Cmin (i; kh) : Suppose i =2 Y: Then, since i D j; we must have Y nfjg [ fig 2 W and i
must be a critical defector in it. However, Y nfjg[fig may or may not be a minimal winning
coalition. If Y nfjg [ fig 2 Wmin, then Y nfjg [ fig 2 Cmin (i; kh) : Since, ch (j) > ch (i),
there must exist at least one coalition Y 2 Cmin (j; kh) ; i =2 Y such that Y nfjg[fig =2 Wmin:
That means there exists a coalition Y 0  Y nfjg such that Y 0 [ fig 2 Wmin: It is obvious
that jY 0 [ figj < kh: Therefore Y 0 [ fig 2 Cmin (i; kt) for some t 2 f1; 2:::h   1g: But by
Proposition 4.1 we know that for all coalitions X 2 Cmin (i; kt) ; such that j =2 X we have
Xnfig[fjg 2 Cmin (j; kt) ; 1  t < h. This in turn implies that Y 0[fjg 2 Cmin (j; kt) which
contradicts that Y 2 Wmin:
(d) ) (c) : Contrary to the claim let us assume that j D i (since we cannot have
i D j). Let h be that value of t such that ch (i) > ch (j) and ct (i) = ct (j) ; 1  t < h:
Using the same reasoning as above we know that there must exist at least one coalition
X 2 Cmin (i; kh) ; j =2 X such that Xnfig [ fjg =2 Wmin: That is, there exists a coalition
X 0  Xnfig such that X 0 [ fjg 2 Wmin: It is obvious that jX 0 [ fjgj < kh: Therefore
X 0 [ fjg 2 Cmin (j; kt) for some t 2 f1; 2:::h  1g. But by Proposition 4.1 we know that for
all coalitions Y 2 Cmin (j; kt) ; such that i =2 Y we have Y nfjg[fig 2 Cmin (i; kt) ; 1  t < h.
This in turn implies that X 0 [ fig 2 Cmin (i; kt) which contradicts that X 2 Wmin:
Now reconsider the example of section 3. M(a) = (1; 2; 0) ; M(b) = (1; 0; 1) ; M(c) =
(0; 2; 1) ; M(d) = (0; 1; 1) ; M(e) = (0; 1; 1) : Since we can easily see that M(a) >L M(b) >L
M(c) >L M(d) =M(e); we have a D b D c D d D e:
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present an e¢ cient method of determining the hierarchy of players who
participate in a decision making process, in terms of their a-priori inuence over the col-
lective action of the voting body. This method is notably simpler than the other existing
mechanisms. We show that given a swap robust voting game, a player i is more desirable
or inuential than another player j if the vector M(i); that is dened by the cardinalities
of the minimal winnig coalitions to which i belongs, lexicographically dominates the vector
M(j): Using this result one can very easily establish the ranking of the players without any
complicated algebraic computations.
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